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The emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior is a fascinating topic in evolutionary
biology and social science. The public goods game (PGG) is a paradigm for exploring cooperative
behavior. In PGG, the total resulting payoff is divided equally among all participants. This feature
still leads to the dominance of defection without substantially magnifying the public good by a
multiplying factor. Much effort has been made to explain the evolution of cooperative strategies,
including a recent model in which only a portion of the total benefit is shared by all the players
through introducing a new strategy named persistent cooperation. A persistent cooperator is a
contributor who is willing to pay a second cost to retrieve the remaining portion of the payoff
contributed by themselves. In a previous study, this model was analyzed in the framework of
well-mixed populations. This paper focuses on discussing the persistent cooperation in lattice-
structured populations. The evolutionary dynamics of the structured populations consisting of three
types of competing players (pure cooperators, defectors and persistent cooperators) are revealed
by theoretical analysis and numerical simulations. In particular, the approximate expressions of
fixation probabilities for strategies are derived on one-dimensional lattices. The phase diagrams of
stationary states, the evolution of frequencies and spatial patterns for strategies are illustrated on
both one-dimensional and square lattices by simulations. Our results are consistent with the general
observation that, at least in most situations, a structured population facilitates the evolution of
cooperation. Specifically, here we find that the existence of persistent cooperators greatly suppresses
the spreading of defectors under more relaxed conditions in structured populations compared to that
obtained in well-mixed population.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Cc,89.65.-s,02.50.Le,87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
How to understand the evolution of cooperative behav-
ior has interested researchers for decades. Evolutionary
game theory [1–3] provides a powerful framework and
effective methods for studying the emergence of coopera-
tion. Among many game models, the public goods game
(PGG) [4–7] – which can be viewed as a generalization of
the Prisoners Dilemma with pairwise interactions [8, 9]
– serves as a paradigm for discovering the mechanism
of cooperative behavior both in theory and experimental
settings [10]. In a PGG, players are required to decide
simultaneously whether or not to invest in the common
pool, i.e., to cooperate or to defect. All participants share
the public resource equally irrespective of their individ-
ual contribution. Obviously, individuals obtain a better
∗Electronic address: j.claussen@jacobs-university.de
one-shot game payoff if they invest nothing into the pub-
lic goods. A selfish population which overexploits the
public goods will finally be trapped in the tragedy of
the commons [11]. Though the existence of selfishness
and competitiveness in human society, field studies and
experiments have verified the fact that humans are will-
ing to cooperate if the conditions are appropriate [12].
Many mechanisms were put forward to enhance coopera-
tion in social dilemmas. For example, social diversity [7]
and voluntary participation in PGG turned out to be a
simple but viable means to overcome this difficulty [13].
Reward (rewarding cooperators at personal cost and ben-
efiting cooperators) and punishment (punishing defectors
by paying a cost and diminishing the defectors) are both
effective ways to promote and sustain cooperation which,
on the other hand, raises the problem of so called second
free riders who exploit the additional contributions of re-
warding players and punishers [14–16]. Punishment is a
mechanism that can facilitate altruism also in animal so-
cieties [17]. However, almost all the previous published
2works based on PGG assumed that the total payoff is
shared equally among all the members engaged in the
game whatever strategies they selected. It is no surprise
that the traditional way of payoff distribution used in
PGG cannot provide positive incentive for players to co-
operate if no other mechanisms exist.
Recently, Liu and Guo proposed a new model consist-
ing of three competing strategies, i.e. persistent cooper-
ation, pure cooperation and defection [18], aiming to ad-
dress the enigma: why cooperators would choose to pun-
ish defectors at personal cost. In their model, cooperators
invest in the public goods at personal cost while defectors
contribute nothing. Only a proportion of the total payoff
is shared among all members, which is different from the
traditional way used in PGG. The contributors who are
willing to pay a second cost to retrieve the remaining part
of the profit invested by themselves are called persistent
cooperators (PC). The model is discussed in well-mixed
populations where all the individuals meet each other at
random with equal probability. The persistent cooper-
ation strategy can evolve under somewhat strict condi-
tions. However in practical situations the populations
are often structural, and individuals have little chance to
interact with anyone randomly and they can only contact
with their neighbors in a certain range. Many researchers
have devoted efforts to the study of evolutionary games in
spatially structured populations [10, 14, 19–22], whereby
space can both facilitate and suppress the evolution of
cooperation [23, 24].
In this paper we discuss the model of persistent co-
operation in lattices, which – albeit being the simplest
type of a structured population – provide an even field
for competing strategies where already the possibility of
network reciprocity is given [23]. For this reason, lattices
enjoy significant popularity in game theoretical models
[25, 26], and, regardless of their difference to the actual
social networks [27], they give us a very helpful entry
point for studying the impact of the structure on the
evolution of cooperation [28].
The remainder of this the paper is organized as follows.
In section II, the game models on lattices are introduced
in detail, and then simulations and theoretical analysis of
the evolutionary dynamics of the strategies are presented
for one-dimensional lattice in section III. The phase di-
agrams of stationary states, the evolution of frequencies
and spatial patterns for strategies on square lattice are
provided in section IV. In section V, a summary is made
based on the analysis and computer simulations in pre-
vious sections.
II. MODELS OF PERSISTENT COOPERATION
ON LATTICES
The PGG is arranged on a lattice with periodic bound-
ary conditions to remove the edge effect. Each player on
site x initially is designated either as a cooperator (C), a
persistent cooperator (PC) or a defector (D) with equal
probability. Players play the game with n immediate
neighbors around them, i.e., each individual is the fo-
cal player of the group he (or she) belongs to. Using
standardized parameters here, both PC-players and C-
players invest an amount 1 into the common pool, while
defectors contribute nothing. The sum of all contribu-
tions is multiplied by a factor r >1, reflecting the syn-
ergic effects of cooperation. Let Px,nPC ,nC be the payoff
that an x−player earns, if he interacts with nPC persis-
tent cooperators, nC cooperators and nD = n−nPC−nC
defectors.
The overall payoff per game round is divided in two
stages: in the first stage, only a fraction s(0 < s < 1)
of the resulted benefit is shared equally among n + 1
participators irrespective of their strategies.
In the second stage, the remaining proportion of the
total income (1−s)r(nPC+nC) is divided into two parts:
One part (1 − s)rnPC contributed by the persistent co-
operators will be retrieved by themselves with persistent
efforts at a second personal cost dnD/(n + 1), where
nD/(n + 1) is the proportion of defectors and d > 0.
Thus in this stage each persistent cooperator gets the
payoff (1 − s)r − dnD/(n + 1). In contrast, the pure
cooperators are unwilling to bear any additional cost to
receive a part of deserved payback (1−s)rnC , so this part
of payoff is again (not equally) shared among cooperators
and defectors. Each defector gets (1 − s)rnC/(n+ 1), a
cooperator reaps [(1−s)rnC−(1−s)rnCnD/(n+1)]/nC .
Here we assume that the PC-players have no intention
to share the (1− s) part of the payoff contributed by the
cooperators.
Therefore, the total payoff for each player engaged in
the game are:
PC,nPC ,nC =
r(nPC + nC + 1)
n+ 1
− 1 (1)
PD,nPC ,nC =
rnC + srnPC
n+ 1
(2)
PPC,nPC ,nC =
r(nc + nPC + 1)
n+ 1
− 1 +
[(1− s)r − d]nD
n+ 1
(3)
Note that the second cost dnD/(n+1) is directly pro-
portional to the frequency of the defectors nD/(n + 1).
In a biological setting, in a population of lions and hye-
nas, lions pay a first cost to kill buffalos. However, they
have to pay a second cost to fight hyenas for keeping the
prey from being robbed [17, 29]. The value of the second
cost depends on the number of hyenas, and determines
the future action of lions: persisting or giving up. The
parameter d in dnD/(n+ 1) represents the degree of the
second cost (persistent cooperating) and it is not neces-
sarily identical to 1. The strategy PC will be less and
less favored by selection if the value of d becomes larger
and larger. With the increase of s, the defectors get more
and more benefit from the PGG without any cost, they
fare better than the cooperators and the persistent co-
operators, thus, all the players in the group are prone
to become free riders. Such transitions perhaps lead to
tragic consequences as in normal PGG. In the following
sections, we investigate the evolution of the competing
3strategies in dependence upon s and d for typical syner-
gic factor r.
All simulations are initialized with a uniform spatial
distribution of the three strategies, and we perform a
random sequential update where each Monte Carlo step
(MCs) is defined as follows:
1. A randomly selected player x plays the PGG with
n neighbors in a group composed of nPC persistent
cooperators, nC cooperators and nD = n− nPC −
nC defectors, and obtains his payoff.
2. One of the n nearest interacting partners of x is
selected at random, denoted by y, and obtains his
payoff.
3. Player x imitates the strategy of y with probability
Q = 1/(1 + exp(w(Px,nPC ,nC − Py,nPC ,nC ))).
In this pairwise comparison update [30], w corresponds
to the inverse temperature in statistical physics, acting
as selection intensity. This choice of Q also resembles
the “logit rule” employed to model human choice behav-
ior [31, 32]. As w ≪ 1 (weak selection, the payoff has
little effect on the strategy selection) [33], Q → 0.5, se-
lection becomes neutral. If w →∞ (strong selection), we
arrive at Q→ 1, or Q→ 0, depending solely on the sign
of the payoff difference, hence the ”pairwise comparison”
updating rule becomes deterministic, indicating that an
individual always adopts his neighbor with higher income
and refuses to imitate one with lower payoff [34]. In our
simulation, without losing generality, we set w = 2, im-
plying that better performing individuals are readily to
be imitated. By the finite choice of w, we never exclude
the situation that a player adopts the strategy of an in-
dividual performing worse than him.
It is known that the system size can influence the
dynamics to a large degree, so we have confirmed our
model in different linear system sizes, e.g., 1000, 4000,
and 10000 for one-dimensional lattice, and the equilib-
rium needs up to 7 × 104 full Monte Carlo steps. For
the square lattice, we perform simulations on two differ-
ent system sizes 100 × 100 and 400 × 400, reaching the
equilibrium needs up to 105 full Monte Carlo steps. The
resulting phase diagrams have similar distributions in the
phase planes. These simulations indicate that our results
are robust in even larger systems.
III. PERSISTENT COOPERATION ON A
ONE-DIMENSIONAL LATTICE
A. Simulation Results
We perform numerical simulations on a one-
dimensional lattice of size 500, where each focal indi-
vidual has n = 2 adjacent neighbors and on its left and
right side, respectively. Fig. 1a illustrates the full phase
diagram based on s and d. The synergic factor r is 2. It
can be seen that the phase plane is partitioned into four
regions denoted by the symbols of strategies that survive
in the final equilibrium state, PC + C (the coexistence
of strategy PC and C), PC, PC +D (the coexistence of
strategy PC and D) and D. The regions of the defectors
and the cooperators (PC and C) are almost equal. If
s < 0.5, i.e., less than half of the total profit is shared
among all the players, although the defectors can exploit
the pure cooperators, their incomes are cut down by the
PC-players, so the defectors vanish in this region due
to their low fitness. With the increasing of s, defectors
get more and more payoff, whose income are higher than
that of the cooperators, hence, the C-players give way
to the defectors. The battle of territory remains between
the persistent cooperators and the defectors. The narrow
region denotes the coexistence of strategy PC and D.
A representative cross-section of (a) at d = 0.4 illus-
trating the frequencies of C,D and PC in dependence
on s is shown in Fig. 1b. If 0.5 ≤ s ≤ 0.65, the battle
among the three strategies ends up with the dominance
of the persistent cooperators. When 0.65 < s < 0.67, the
defectors come up, whose frequency increases from zero
to one quickly. While s ≥ 0.67, the defectors win the
game, the persistent cooperators disappear completely.
Fig. 1c is a spatial pattern of the model indicating how
the three strategies evolve within 400 full MCs. Starting
from a random initial design, the cooperators vanish soon
in the competition due to their lower income. So the bat-
tle mostly occurs only between the persistent cooperators
and the defectors. Players with the same strategy form
compact clusters quickly to fight against their opponents.
We find that the variations of the evolutionary dynam-
ics are not remarkable between two adjacent full Monte
Carlo steps. The main reason is that there are countable
boundaries in one-dimensional lattice-structured popula-
tion. The transitions of strategies only take place at the
boundaries of these tight clusters, so most of the individ-
uals have little opportunity to interact with their oppo-
nents once the clusters have established. The frequencies
of two adjacent interacting pairs of players with different
strategies (e.g., PC −D and C −D) approach zero since
the interface density decays with time with a scaling that
depends on the type of update [35]. The scaling of char-
acteristic domain length during a similar three-species
coarsening process has been elucidated in [36, 37] for the
case of cyclic coevolution and it can be anticipated that
similar scaling laws hold also in the non-cyclic case.
Fig. 1d elucidates the dynamics of the three strategy
frequencies when s = 0.66 and d = 0.4. The frequency
of strategy C decreases to zero soon, which is quite dif-
ferent from the feature exhibited in well-mixed popula-
tion. In well-mixed populations, the time for strategy
C involved in the contest is much longer than that in
lattice-structured populations.
B. Fixation Probability
In well-mixed population, if (1 − s)r < d + 1, i.e.
s > 1 − (d + 1)/r (s > 0.44 for r = 2.5, d = 0.4), de-
fection is the only evolutionary stable strategy and can
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FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) Full s− d phase diagram obtained
for r = 2, w = 2. Different phases are denoted by the symbols
of strategies that survive finally in the equilibrium state. Solid
lines indicate continuous transitions between different states.
(b) A representative cross-section of (a) at d = 0.4 illustrating
the frequencies of C,D and PC depending on s. (c) is a spa-
tial pattern of the model indicating how the three strategies
evolves within 400 full MCs, where s = 0.55, d = 0.4. (d) The
changes of the three strategies with time as s = 0.66, d = 0.4.
FIG. 2: (Color online.) Players with different strategies are
aligned on one dimensional lattice, transitions only occur at
the boundary sites between two runs of players with different
strategies, and then the focal individual will be replaced by
one of its nearest neighbors.
repel the invasion of rare persistent cooperators [18]. So
it is quite difficult for persistent cooperation to establish
itself in a population dominated by defection initially.
However, in a one-dimensional lattice model, numerical
simulations show that a persistent cooperator can in-
vade a population dominated by defectors successfully
and become fixed when s = 0.45 (> 0.44). Motivated by
this observation, we are to find the condition for success-
ful invasion and fixation of PC(D) in a one-dimensional
lattice-structured population.
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the strategy transitions only
occur at the boundary sites between two clusters of play-
ers with different strategies, which follow a random-walk,
and the focal individual will be replaced by one of his
nearest neighbors according to pair comparison.
Let fn(t) be the probability that a cluster consisting
of n players with the same strategy (named n-cluster) at
time t survives and takes over the whole population in the
end. αn is the transition probability from a n-cluster to
a (n+1)-cluster in a unit time, while βn is the transition
probability from a n-cluster to a (n− 1)-cluster. The n-
cluster remains the same with probability 1 − αn − βn.
The basic equations obtained by birth-death stochastic
process are:

f0(t) =0
fn(t) =fn(t)(1 − αn − βn) + fn+1(t)αn
+ fn−1(t)βn, 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1
fN(t) =1
(4)
A direct calculation [38] shows that the fixation prob-
ability, which is defined as the probability that a mutant
invading a population of N − 1 resident individuals will
produce a lineage which takes over the whole population
[39, 40], is given by
f1(t) =
1
1 +
∑N−1
n=1
∏n
j=1 βj/αj
(5)
The most critical step here is to find the transition
probabilities αn and βn, n=1,2,. . . ,N . Firstly, let xPC
and xD be the global frequencies of strategy PC and
D on one-dimensional lattice, respectively. Secondly, we
regard j − i− k as a strategy-triplet. Each focal i-player
5has n = 2 adjacent neighbors (j-player and k-player)
on his left and right side, as illustrated in Fig. 2. By
the frequency of the triplet denoted by xi−j−k , i, j, k ∈
{C,D, PC}, the dynamics of PC and D are expressed
by the following differential equations:
x˙PC = −QPC,1,0xD−PC−PC −QPC,1,1xPC−PC−C
−QPC,0,2xC−PC−C −QPC,0,0xD−PC−D
−QPC,0,1xD−PC−C(PC → D)
−QPC,0,1xD−PC−C(PC → C) (6)
+QD,1,0xPC−D−D +QD,1,1xPC−D−C
+QD,2,0xPC−D−PC +QC,1,0xPC−C−D
+QC,1,1xPC−C−C +QC,2,0xPC−C−PC
x˙D = −QD,1,0xPC−D−D −QD,0,1xD−D−C
−QD,2,0xPC−D−PC −QD,0,2xC−D−C
−QD,1,1xPC−D−C(D → PC)
−QD,1,1xPC−D−C(D → C) (7)
+QPC,0,1xD−PC−C +QPC,1,0xD−PC−PC
+QPC,0,0xD−PC−D +QC,1,0xPC−C−D
+QC,0,1xD−C−C +QC,0,0xD−C−D
The first term on the right hand side in (4) is the rate
that a focal PC-player surrounded by a D-player and a
PC-player on his left and right side switches to be a de-
fector in a unit time. It is a product of the imitation
probability QPC,1,0 = 1/(1 + exp(w(PPC,1,0 − PD,1,0)))
(the focal PC-player interacts with a defector and a co-
operator on its left and right side respectively, and then
imitates the strategy of the defector) and the frequency
of the triplet D − PC − PC. If and only if the PC-
player imitates the strategy of the D-player, the fre-
quency of PC can change. The negative sign takes care
of the negative change of the frequency of PC. Be-
cause the triplet PC − PC − D has the same function
as D − PC − PC, there is a factor 2 for the frequency
of D − PC − PC, but it is canceled by another fac-
tor 0.5, the probability that each individual is selected
on both sides of the PC-player. Similar explanations
hold for other frequencies of strategy-triplets. Notably,
though the two expressions QPC,0,1xD−PC−C(PC → D)
and QPC,0,1xD−PC−C(PC → C) in the second row in (4)
have the common term QPC,0,1xD−PC−C , they represent
different cases. One case is that the PC-player imitates
the strategy of the D-player, which leads to the reduc-
tion of the number of PC-players by one. The other
case is that the PC-player imitates the strategy of the
C-player, which also leads to the reduction of the num-
ber of PC-players by one. We use arrows PC → C
and PC → D to distinguish the two cases. Simi-
larly the terms QD,1,0xPC−D−D, QD,1,1xPC−D−C and
QD,2,0xPC−D−PC (QC,1,0xPC−C−D, QC,1,1xPC−C−C
and QC,2,0xPC−C−PC) are the transitions from a D-
player (C-player) to a PC-player, which result in positive
changes of the frequency of strategy PC.
Lastly, we suppose that the configurations are uni-
formly distributed in space. From the definition of the
process, the transition probabilities for strategy PC can
be given by the following expressions:
αPCn =


1
4
[QD,1,0 +QD,1,1 +QC,1,0
+QC,1,1] , α
PC , n = 1, 2, . . . , N − 2
1
2
(QD,2,0 +QC,2,0) , α
PC
N−1, n = N − 1
(8)
βPCn =


1
4
[QPC,0,2 +QPC,0,0
+QPC,0,1(PC → C)
+QPC,0,1(PC → D)] , β
PC
1 , n = 1
1
2
(QPC,1,0 +QPC,1,1) , β
PC , n = 2, . . . , N − 1.
(9)
The correspondent transition probabilities for strategyD
are:
αDn =


1
4
[QPC,0,1 +QPC,1,0 +QC,0,1
+QC,1,0] , α
D, n = 1, 2, . . . , N − 2
1
2
(QPC,0,0 +QC,0,0) , α
D
N−1, n = N − 1
(10)
βDn =


1
4
[QD,0,2 +QD,2,0
+QD,1,1(D → PC)
+QD,1,1(D → C)] , β
D
1 , n = 1
1
2
(QD,1,0 +QD,0,1) , β
D, n = 2, . . . , N − 1.
(11)
Therefore, according to (7), the fixation probability of
PC(D) is
f i1(t) =
1
1+
βi
1
αi
+
∑N−2
n=2
βi
1
αi
(β
i
αi
)n−1+
βi
1
αi
βi
αi
N−1
(β
i
αi
)N−3
(12)
i ∈ {PC,D}
If the number of individuals in this lattice-structured
population is large enough, the fixation probability may
be approximated by
f i1(t) =
{
αi−βi
αi−βi+βi
1
, αi > βi
0, αi ≤ βi
(13)
Similar procedures can be used for finding the fixation
probability of strategy C. In particular, if the population
is only composed of persistent cooperators and defectors,
the expressions of fixation probabilities of PC and D are
the same as in equation (13), where
αPCn =
{
QD,1,0, n = 1, 2, . . . , N − 2
QD,2,0 n = N − 1
βPCn =
{
QPC,0,0, n = 1
QPC,1,0 n = 2, . . . , N − 1.
(14)
αDn =
{
QPC,1,0, n = 1, 2, . . . , N − 2
QPC,0,0, n = N − 1
6βDn =
{
QD,2,0, n = 1
QD,1,0, n = 2, . . . , N − 1.
(15)
Now, to make a direct comparison with the results ob-
tained in well-mixed population, we analyze the transi-
tion probabilities in (8) and (9) under the limit of weak
selection by Taylor expansion under which we have:
αPC ≈
1
2
+
w
8
[(1− s)r − 1− 2k/3]
βPC ≈
1
2
+
w
8
[k/3 + 1− (1− s)r] (16)
and
αD ≈
1
2
+
w
8
[k/3 + 2− (1− s)r]
βD ≈
1
2
+
w
8
[(1− s)r − 2k/3− 2] (17)
We distinguish two cases:
(1) If 1+ d
2
< r(1− s) < 3+d
2
, i.e. 1− 3+d
2r
< s < 1− 2+d
2r
(0.317 < s < 0.52, as can be observed in Fig. 3c),
though the fixation probability of D is larger than
that of PC in this range, we still have αPC > βPC
which follows that a single PC-player has a positive
probability to invade and become fixed in a one-
dimensional lattice-structured population occupied
by C-players and D-players. However, in this case
the PC-players can not be fixated in a well-mixed
population [18].
(2) If r(1 − s) > 3+d
2
i.e. s < 3+d
2r
(s < 0.317), which is
equivalent to the conditions αPC > βD and βPC >
βD we reach the conclusion fPC1 > f
D
1 . In this case
the PC-players are rather advantageous. A single
PC-player is easier to invade, survive and fix in the
population than a single D individual.
The fixation probabilities for PC (green line) and D
(red line) on a one-dimensional lattice predicted by equa-
tion (19) are shown in Fig. 3, respectively. Parame-
ters are r = 2.5 and d = 0.4 for all panels (a) to
(d). Figs. 3a+c show that in a one-dimensional lattice-
structured population with three strategies PC, C and
D, a single PC-player can invade successfully, reproduce
inchmeal and become fixed with a positive probability
if s < 0.52. For s > 0.52, a single PC fails to invade
in the population, and cannot escape from the bad luck
of going extinct. Figures 3a+c present a little difference
because of the different values of w. Notably, a PC in-
vader can be fixed easier than a D player if s < 0.346
for w = 2 (0.317 for w = 0.2). When s > 0.346 (0.317
for w = 0.2), the opposite case occurs. Fig. 3b (w = 2)
and Fig. 3d (w = 0.2) illustrate the fixation probabilities
of PC and D in a population of only persistent coopera-
tors and defectors, respectively. s = 0.52 is the threshold
for PC and D being evolution stable strategy, as labeled
in Figs. 3b+d. While in well-mixed population composed
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) and (c): The fixation probabili-
ties for strategy PC (green line) and D (red line) in a one-
dimensional lattice-structured population with C,D and PC.
(b) and (d): The fixation probabilities for strategy PC (green
line) and D (red line) in one-dimensional lattice-structured
population with only D and PC. Parameters are set as
r = 2.5, d = 0.4 for all (a) to (d). Simulations are performed
on 500 × 1 lattice for the fixation probabilities of PC (green
solid dots) and D (red solid diamonds), respectively.
7of only PC-players and D-players, persistent cooperators
dominate defectors if s < 1 − (1 + d)/r = 0.44(< 0.52)
for r = 2.5, d = 0.4. Due to the existence of cooperators,
the range of s for the fixation of D is somewhat larger
than that of PC.
Numerical simulation results on a one-dimensional lat-
tice of finite size 500 are presented in Fig. 3 by green
solid dots for PC and red diamonds for D. Just for con-
venience to construct the model to obtain the fixation
probabilities, we simply assume that the strategy-triplets
are uniformly located on the lattice, but it is more real-
istic to take into account the aggregation degree of the
same strategy and the density of the population on the
lattice model. When performing numerical simulations,
we let the strategies be randomly located on the one-
dimensional lattice. As shown in Fig. 3, the simulation
results are well consistent with the theoretical results ob-
tained by formula (13).
As shown in Fig. 4, a single PC-player invades the
one-dimensional lattice-structured population of C and
D. Since the cooperators are always exploited by the
defectors without the protection of the PC-players, the
number of the C-players becomes less and less. The pure
cooperators disappear in a short time. But single PC-
players, surrounded by defectors who exploit pure co-
operators, can proliferate and grow offspring forming a
compact cluster drawing back the (1 − s) proportion of
the payoff contributed by themselves from the defectors.
The defectors are defeated in the end.
IV. PERSISTENT COOPERATION ON A
SQUARE LATTICE
In this section, we shall consider persistent coopera-
tion on square lattice. After the three strategies are as-
signed uniformly at random on a square lattice, a ran-
domly selected individual plays the game with n = 4
neighbors (von Neumann neighborhood) around him, i.e.
each player is the focal one of the group.
In a square lattice-structured population with only co-
operators and defectors in previous studies [41], with
similar values of the parameters in our model, cooper-
ators survive only if r > 3.74 and crowd out defectors
completely for r > 5.49. These results can be taken as
benchmarks for evaluating the impact of persistent coop-
eration on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in
structured populations. In this section, we focus on dis-
cussing how different combinations of s and d affecting
the evolution of the three strategies based on two differ-
ent synergic factor r = 2 and 3.5, representing for low
and high synergetic effects of cooperation, respectively.
We begin with r = 2. Fig. 5a depicts the full s − d
phase diagram, which is partitioned into several regions.
From left to right, we observe the coexisting region of PC
and C first. In this region, only a small fraction of the to-
tal benefit is shared, so there is no space for the survival
of defectors due to their low income. While for inter-
mediate s, the D-players obtain more of the total public
goods than ever, the persistent cooperators have to com-
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FIG. 4: (Color online) A single PC-player invades success-
fully, reproduces inchmeal and becomes fixed in a 500×1
lattice-structured population. (a) - (c) are characteristic
snapshots of the evolution dynamics over time for PC. The
parameters are r = 2.5, w = 2, s = 0.45 and d = 0.4. Colors
(blue, green and red) show the distribution of cooperators,
persistent cooperators and defectors.
pete with the defectors for survival and retrieve their
income participated by the defectors. Owing to their
higher benefit, the PC-players perform better than the
defectors. Therefore, the PC-players govern the whole
population. With increasing s, the PC-players fail to
crowd out the defectors. The pure cooperators are more
impressionable to be exploited by the defectors than the
persistent cooperators because of their lower gain and
small synergic factor r, they give way to the defectors.
So there comes a very narrow territory for the coexistence
of PC and D. Finally, still due to the lower r and that
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FIG. 5: (Color online.) (a) Full svsd phase diagram obtained
for r = 2. Different phases are denoted by the symbols of
strategies that survive finally in the equilibrium state. Solid
lines indicate continuous transitions between different states.
(b) A representative cross-section of (a) at d = 0.4, illustrat-
ing the frequencies of C,D and PC in dependence on s.
more than half of the total payoff is shared among all
the participators irrespective to their strategies, it is not
so tempting to retrieve the (1 − s) fraction of the pay-
off contributed by themselves comparing to the second
cost degree. The PC-players lose their superiority in the
competition. Hence all players transform their strategies
and turn to be free riders.
A typical cross-reference of Fig. 5a is shown in Fig. 5b
at intermediate second cost degree d = 0.4, which illus-
trates the frequencies of C, D and PC in dependence on
s. If s ≤ 0.4, the suppression of treacherous actions is
so powerful that it enables not only the reproduction of
persistent cooperators but also the compatibility of tra-
ditional cooperators. It is necessary to point out that
the PC-players get the same harvest as C-players in the
absence of defectors, and the two types of cooperating
individuals imitate each other with probability 0.5, now
the model can be viewed as a voter model [42]. So, when
s is less than the critical value as described above, af-
ter the defectors are driven out, the whole system either
falls in a homogenous state of PC(C) or a mixed state
of PC and C occasionally according to the initial state
which is in accordance with the phase diagrams. While
0.4 < s < 0.55, the PC individuals occupy the popula-
tion and the frequency of C becomes 0 due to the exploit
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FIG. 6: (Color online.) Characteristic pictures of evolution-
ary dynamics of the three strategies on a 100×100 square lat-
tice with specially prepared initial distribution. Colors blue,
green and red show the location of cooperators (C), persis-
tent cooperators (PC) and defectors (D), respectively. The
snapshots were taken at (a) t=0, (b) t=50, (c) t=200 and
(d) t=400 full MCs, respectively. The parameter values were
r = 2.0, s = 0.5, and d = 0.4.
9by the defectors. If s hits the threshold value 0.555, de-
fectors appear, and the frequency of D increases from
0 to 1 monotonously. Though the PC-players remain
alive, the amount of them reduces sharply to zero dur-
ing a short time. Each individual then choses to be a
defector if s > 0.56. This can be verified by analyzing
the snapshots of strategies’ distribution in Fig. 5. We
use a specially prepared initial state similar to that in
[22], which has three distinct interfaces among the three
strategies. To gain insight into the influence of PC and
the evolution of the three strategies over time, we may
focus on the movements of these interfaces that separate
the three strategies. The defectors (red) outperform the
pure cooperators (blue) because of the low synergic fac-
tor r, they can break into the territory of the C-players
easily. But the cooperators can survive in the vicinity of
persistent cooperators, as shown in Fig. 5c. Meanwhile,
since s is not large, the defectors gain not so much pay-
off as they expect, they have to imitate the strategy of
PC-players (green) around them. Therefore, persistent
cooperators cross the fence between PC and D, and in-
hibit the spread of strategy D. The defectors finally lose
their territory in the competition. While s is less than
the critical value and d is not too large, the final sta-
ble state of the population will be the dominated by the
PC-players.
We proceed to discuss the evolutionary dynamics of
the three strategies for relative high synergic factor r =
3.5, at which the cooperators still be the loser in the
evolutionary process without any supporting mechanism.
Comparing to the full s − d phase diagram presented in
Fig. 5a, it is clear that the qualitative characteristics in
Fig. 7a remain intact to a large degree. Similar to the
observations found for r = 2, again here we detect a wide
region of the coexistence state of PC and C. One of the
most remarkable differences between the two diagrams,
is of course the expansion of the coexistence region of
PC and D, owing to the spatial reciprocity [23]. When
s is quite large, the persistent cooperators disappear and
leave a much narrower region for the defectors than the
space in Fig. 5a. This is in accordance with intuition
in view of synergic factor, which promotes cooperating
behavior.
Fig. 7b confirms the results from the quantitative as-
pect. In our simulation, if s is less than 0.855, which
is much larger than that for r = 2 as well as the criti-
cal value in well-mixed population and one-dimensional
lattice-structured population, PC-players are conquerors
in most time. When s increases and exceeds the critical
value, the frequency of PC falls down to 0 as sharply as
depicted in Fig. 5b. It follows that if s is larger than the
threshold, the PC-players have the fate to be driven out
in the competition sooner or later for any r < 3.79.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Mankind which engages in various complex games of
cooperation and defection achieves highest forms of co-
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FIG. 7: (Color online.) (a) Full s vs d phase diagram obtained
for r = 3.5. Different phases are denoted by symbols of strate-
gies that survive finally in the equilibrium state. Solid lines
indicate continuous transitions between different states. (b)
A representative cross-reference of (a) at d = 0.4, illustrating
the frequencies of C,D and PC depending on s.
operation among all life forms on the earth [43]. Many
mechanisms were proposed to discover the mystery why
natural selection is in favor of cooperative behavior, in-
cluding the new model proposed by Liu and Guo [18], in
which the total resulted payoff is shared in a different way
from the normal PGG, that is, only a proportion of the
total profit is shared by all the players irrelevant to their
individual contribution. They introduced a new strategy
named persistent cooperation in well-mixed populations.
A persistent cooperator is a contributor who is willing
to pay a second cost to retrieve the remaining portion of
the payoff contributed by themselves.
In this paper, we focused on investigating the impact
of persistent cooperating on the evolution of coopera-
tion in spatial public goods games. The evolutionary dy-
namics of the structured populations consisting of three
types of competing players (pure cooperators, defectors
and persistent cooperators) are revealed by theoretical
analysis and numerical simulations. In particular, we de-
rive the approximate expressions of fixation probabilities
for strategies on one-dimensional lattice. By using one-
dimensional lattice and square lattice as the basic inter-
acting network, the spatial patterns of cooperation are
discussed by means of the phase diagrams of stationary
states of strategies depending on different combinations
10
of distribution fraction of the total payoff and the sec-
ond cost degree. The results reveal many relevant dif-
ferences compared with the conclusions derived in well-
mixed populations. Such as, the coexistence ofD and PC
never appears in well-mixed populations but comes up in
lattice-structured populations. The evolutionary time for
PC to reach the equilibrium state in lattice-structured
populations is much shorter than that in well-mixed pop-
ulations. Furthermore, the ranges of parameters for PC
dominating the whole lattice-structured populations are
larger than that for well-mixed populations. Our results
also show that persistent cooperation promotes the evo-
lution of cooperation for low synergic factor r effectively,
though defection takes over a considerably large terri-
tory in full phase diagram of s versus d. For relative
high synergic factor, cooperators can survive attribute
to network reciprocity. In addition, comparing the fixa-
tion probability of a PC-mutant with that of a D-mutant
on one-dimensional lattice provides further understand-
ing for persistent cooperation in structured populations.
For example, in some rigorous situations the difficulty
in invasion and fixation of cooperation in a population
consisting of non-cooperating individuals in well-mixed
populations can be solved in the lattice-structured pop-
ulations.
It is also interesting to compare the persistent cooper-
ation model studied here with punishment models that
were introduced in the context of PGGs to eliminate
free riding (defection) and falilitate cooperation [15, 16].
Whether cooperation is facilitated, however may depend
– besides network structure [28] – on parameters like the
degree of rationality [44], and, in general, on the imple-
mentation of punishment in the game. Punishment can
be introduced in different forms, namely pool punishment
[45] and peer punishment [46, 47]. In comparison between
punishing cooperators and punishing defectors Helbing et
al. [48] showed that a fixed and finite interacting neigh-
borhood can resolve the dilemma of second-order free-
riding by separating punishing cooperators form pure co-
operators. Letting pool and peer punishment compete
in the game, Szolnoki at al. showed that peer punishers
outperform the pool punishers and control the system in
large segments of parameters [49]. Punishment mecha-
nisms may also be applied to human behavior in mone-
tary systems: Recently, Wang et al. studied a model of
tax system as an approach of punishment [50]. Over-
all, all punishment strategies in the previous models are
costly. However, the purpose of persistent cooperators
in our model is not only punishing defectors but also
retrieving their deserved payoff. One main difference be-
tween our model and the previous ones is that the payoff
of PC-strategy is not always less than the pure cooper-
ators. i.e. the benefit of PC-players is larger than that
of cooperators if (1 − s)r − d > 0. By this way, second-
order free-riding problem can be avoided in appropriate
range of s and d for certain r without incurring personal
benefit.
In conclusion, new interesting phenomena occur in a
dynamics where agents play the PGG with persistent
cooperation in lattice-structured populations. The ex-
istence of persistent cooperators greatly suppresses the
spreading of defectors under more relaxed conditions in
structured populations than that in well-mixed popula-
tion. Furthermore, our results are consistent not only
with the conclusion that the population structures fa-
cilitate the evolution of cooperation in most situations,
but also the common social experience that the higher
the fraction in sharing the total benefit equally the less
active humans are in cooperating.
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Appendix A: Game payoffs of steps 1 and 2
The overall payoff per game round is divided in two
stages: in the first stage, only a fraction s(0 < s < 1) of
the resulted benefit is shared equally among n+1 partic-
ipators irrespective of their strategies. Every cooperator
obtains
P 1C,nPC ,nC =
sr(nPC + nC + 1)
n+ 1
− 1
and a defector has
P 1D,nPC ,nC =
sr(nPC + nC)
n+ 1
while each persistent cooperator receives
P 1PC,nPC ,nC =
sr(nPC + nC + 1)
n+ 1
− 1
In the second stage, the remaining proportion of the
total income (1−s)r(nPC+nC) is divided into two parts:
One part (1 − s)rnPC contributed by the persistent co-
operators will be retrieved by themselves with persistent
efforts at a second personal cost dnD/(n + 1), where
nD/(n + 1) is the proportion of defectors and d > 0.
Thus in this stage each persistent cooperator gets the
payoff (1− s)r− dnD/(n+1). However the pure cooper-
ators are unwilling to bear additional cost to take back
this part of deserved payback (1− s)rnC , so this part of
payoff is again but not equally shared among cooperators
and defectors. Each defector gets (1 − s)rnC/(n+ 1), a
cooperator reaps [(1−s)rnC−(1−s)rnCnD/(n+1)]/nC .
Here we assume that the PC-players are so friendly and
generous that they have no intension to share the (1− s)
part of the payoff contributed by the cooperators. Hence,
in this stage, every cooperator earns
P 2C,nPC ,nC = (1− s)r −
(1− s)rnD
n+ 1
(A1)
and a defector has
P 2D,nPC ,nC =
(1− s)rnC
n+ 1
(A2)
while each persistent cooperator receives
P 2PC,nPC ,nC = (1− s)r −
dnD
n+ 1
(A3)
Therefore, the total payoff for each player engaged in
the game are:
PC,nPC ,nC = P
1
C,nPC ,nC
+ P 2C,nPC ,nC
=
r(nPC + nC + 1)
n+ 1
− 1
(A4)
and a defector has
PD,nPC ,nC = P
1
D,nPC ,nC
+ P 2D,nPC ,nC
=
rnC + srnPC
n+ 1
(A5)
while each persistent cooperator receives
PPC,nPC ,nC = P
1
PC,nPC ,nC
+ P 2PC,nPC ,nC
= PC,nPC ,nC +
[(1− s)r − d]nD
n+ 1
(A6)
